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Soldier Enhancement: Ethical Risks 
and Opportunities
Matthew Beard, Jai Galliott and Sandra Lynch
Abstract
Over the past decade, interest in human enhancement has waxed and 
waned. The initial surge of interest and funding, driven by the US Army’s 
desire for a ‘Future Force Warrior’ has partly given way to the challenges of 
meeting operational demands abroad. However the ethical opportunities 
provided by soldier enhancement demand that investigation of its 
possibilities continue. Benefits include enhanced decision-making, improved 
force capability, reduced force size and lower casualty rates.
These benefits — and enhancement itself — carry concomitant risks, 
including morale issues due to tension between enhanced and unenhanced 
soldiers, the issues of enhanced veterans and ownership of enhanced 
bodies, challenges to the army’s core values and personal identity issues. A 
range of measures should be designed to highlight the opportunities offered 
by enhancement while also minimising the potential risks. This includes 
providing advice on which areas the army ought to demonstrate restraint in 
research for ethical reasons.
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Introduction
Modern military research and weapons development are marked by the 
ongoing pursuit of a dehumanised battlespace replete with robots, drones 
and other unmanned systems. While there are a number of reasons for this, 
one is certainly the desire to remove the ‘human element’ from combat: 
emotion, error and the physical limitations of human combatants (including 
mortality) and the risk of overwhelming decision-making capacities. 
However, a rival school of thought is beginning to emerge that notes the 
continuing importance of the human element in combat and aims to improve 
human combatants rather than replace them. This is the field of military 
human enhancement. 
Enhancement is defined as ‘a medical or biological intervention to the body 
designed to improve performance, appearance, or capability besides what 
is necessary to achieve, sustain or restore health’.1 This article will explore 
some of the ethical opportunities provided by the enhancement of soldiers 
in the Australian Army, focusing on areas of moral concern. Its purpose in 
doing so is to ensure decision-makers developing official army policy on 
these matters consider and understand all the relevant ethical issues.
Military human enhancement: ethical opportunities
It is important to distinguish between the different types of opportunities that 
might be provided by military human enhancement. Not every advantage 
offered by enhancement is ethical in nature. This is not to say that these 
advantages are unethical; rather, it is to suggest that the advantages 
they offer are functional, strategic, pragmatic or otherwise not specifically 
concerned with whether an action is inherently good or bad, which is the 
domain of ethics. 
In some cases, military advantages may also be ethical advantages (for 
instance, a soldier who can stay alert for extended periods may be in a 
position to make better ethical judgements due to a lack of fatigue), but 
these second and third-order consequences of enhancement are beyond 
the domain of this discussion. The analysis that follows will address two 
major advantages presented by military human enhancement. 
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1. Decreased combat force size
One ethical benefit of the human enhancement of soldiers is the possibility 
that, as the capabilities of individual combatants increase, the demand for 
large numbers of combatants in order to wage war will — all other things 
being equal — decrease.2 This, in turn, will generate decreased numbers of 
combat forces over time. 
The diminished size of military forces around the world has a tangible ethical 
consequence — reduced rates of casualties. Although the death of any 
combatant is tragic, if the military enhancement of some soldiers means 
that fewer combatants are killed overall, the net gain in terms of human lives 
spared improves the ability of a military force to adhere to moral norms. 
The reason that this is an ethical advantage is because the morality of war 
has traditionally insisted that military conflicts are only morally acceptable 
when the anticipated benefits of conflict outweigh the concomitant 
harms. The most obvious example of this occurs in just war theory, a 
moral framework for war that originated over 2000 years ago in which 
proportionality is a crucial moral principle both ad bellum (before combat) 
and in bello (during combat).3 The most obvious harm in war is the 
widespread loss of life to both combatants and non-combatants; these 
deaths need to be weighed against any anticipated benefits and shown to 
be acceptable costs before a war can be considered justified.4 Hence, if the 
anticipated combatant deaths were fewer, this would increase the possibility 
of achieving proportionate conflict.
This is particularly significant because of the importance of popular and 
political support for war in Australian and the West, and the increasing 
intolerance of civilians and military decision-makers alike to even minimal 
casualties. This view may make it difficult for even morally justified military 
engagements to be undertaken. However, if enhanced military personnel are 
more physically adept, psychologically resilient, and more likely to survive, 
this may empower the military to engage in wars that are morally necessary, 
but which have been previously regarded as politically untenable due to 
civilian resistance to the possibility of military casualties.5
The same principles that make enhancement appealing due to the 
potentially reduced casualty rate also explain why human enhancement may 
provide second-order ethical opportunities. Although the most substantial 
and dramatic consequences of war involve the loss of human life, the 
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material damage to property and infrastructure is also significant and must 
affect judgements of proportionality. If human enhancement offers the 
possibility for smaller sized forces than are presently required to effectively 
wage war, a beneficial side-effect of this may be the reduced size of the 
theatre of war. This, in turn, may result in a reduction in the extent of damage 
or destruction to civilian infrastructure during conflict. 
1.1 Resort to war
To maximise these advantages, however, it will be crucial for the army to 
recommit to other values present in the ad bellum doctrine, such as just 
cause, right intention and last resort, lest the promise of reduced casualty 
rates become a force multiplier by lowering the threshold for war. If a major 
objection to the use of force is the anticipated casualties and destruction 
of infrastructure, and reduced force sizes decrease the risk of these, then 
military human enhancement may undermine the proportionality barrier to 
implementing military force.  
This may not be an insurmountable problem because proportionality is not 
the only condition by which the use of force is legitimated. Equally important 
are conditions such as the justice of the cause, the intentions behind the use 
of force, and the requirement that force be used only as a reasonable last 
resort. However, although these conditions are integral aspects of just war 
theory, the moral framework that has informed most reflection on the use 
of force both in Western armed forces and international law, they may not 
receive the same attention in practice. When military force is contextualised 
within a particular political climate, it may be that only those conditions 
that have the highest public profile will receive due attention —in this case, 
proportionality. However, if the army is to retain its moral authority both 
within Australia and in the global community, it will need to retain its deep 
and abiding commitment to conscientious moral regulation of the use of 
force, even if the risk of casualties is diminished by human enhancement.
1.2 Staggered force reduction
Furthermore, although it is evident that there are ethical advantages that 
may emerge from combat force reduction, the actual reduction in force size 
needs to be implemented slowly and carefully to ensure that the ethical 
advantages gained by the army do not impose burdens on the broader 
community or the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. A large-scale force 
reduction over a short period of time risks leaving a far greater population of 
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veterans facing re-integration issues than the Department of Veterans’ Affairs 
could reasonably hope to manage in an efficient manner. With processing 
difficulties in the early stages of discharge already a factor in the number 
of veterans either unemployed or homeless, the failure to patiently and 
gradually reduce force sizes in line with the existing rate of retirement from 
the army is likely to lead to a whole new category of ethical difficulties. 
2. Enhanced decision-making
One of the more interesting areas of human enhancement in the military 
concerns the ability to use particular drugs to change a soldier’s neural 
functioning in order to enhance capability. Much of this already takes 
place; for instance, in the United States (US) Air Force pilots are provided 
with modafinil, a drug that enhances alertness and focus and allows 
a person to function for up to 60 hours without sleep.6 If advances in 
psychopharmacology can be used to alter a person’s level of alertness, 
and there is an immense market for using similar drugs to alter mood, then 
similar kinds of intervention may improve decision-making in a way that 
produces ethically desirable outcomes. While it is beyond the scope of this 
discussion to discuss the viability or extent to which these interventions will 
become reality, this article will outline some general ethical opportunities 
for continuing research in this vein, as well as potential pitfalls that must be 
addressed carefully.7  
2.1 Protection of non-combatants
Military ethics includes a range of principles that govern how combat is 
undertaken and what is justifiable during armed conflict. Arguably the most 
important of these norms is discrimination or non-combatant immunity. This 
condition — also enshrined in international law — requires combatants to 
avoid intentionally targeting those who are not involved in conflict and, by 
extension, requires those combatants to take reasonable risks to ensure 
that non-combatants are not harmed as a side-effect of permissible military 
operations. 
At first glance, it may be unclear how enhancement offers the possibility 
of improved adherence in this area, as army personnel are already aware 
of and committed to protecting non-combatants, with their own lives if 
necessary. The opportunities presented by enhancement are not aimed 
at improving the moral character of soldiers, but rather at their ability to 
comprehend complex situations and reach ethical judgements quickly, as 
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well as their ability to control emotional responses that may make ethical 
judgements more difficult. In this case, the enhancement is actually to 
neural processing, but with second-order ethical advantages. For instance, 
enhanced soldiers might be more readily able to determine whether a 
momentary glimpse of movement during a firefight is a non-combatant 
running for cover, an ally, or an enemy combatant looking to flank their 
position. In this case, improved situational processing may lead to better 
consequences for non-combatants in conflict. 
Another case in which human enhancement may have an explicitly ethical 
effect is in restricting the strength or experience of ‘counter-moral emotions’ 
in soldiers. Although extremely well trained and motivated, soldiers are still 
prone to occasionally experiencing emotions that lead them to act in ways 
they otherwise would not. Thomas Douglas explores this possibility, writing 
that: 
Enhancement might consist in the attenuation of counter-moral 
emotions: emotions that interfere with moral reasoning, sympathy, 
and all other plausible candidates for ‘morally good motives’ … 
Biomedical moral enhancement might sometimes consist in the 
biomedical attenuation of these emotions.8
For example, in 2005 US soldiers responded to the death of a member of 
their company from a roadside bomb by killing 24 Iraqi civilians in the nearby 
town of Haditha. Military philosopher Nancy Sherman contends that ‘the 
events of Haditha [should be seen] through the lens of traditional revenge 
and honour. The Haditha rampage took the form of a reprisal raid, inspired 
by the US brigade experiencing the killing of one of their own.’9 
It is plausible to assume that the visceral reaction to seeing the death of a 
person who is not merely a colleague but also a brother or sister-in-arms 
would result in overpowering feelings of hatred, diminished empathy or 
aggression that ideally would not be in the psychological make-up of military 
professionals. Jonathan Shay describes these situations as ‘berserk states’, 
‘in which abuse after abuse is committed’.10 To Shay, 
The berserker is figuratively — sometimes literally — blind to 
everything but his destructive aim. He cannot see the distinction 
between civilian and combatant or even the distinction between 
comrade and enemy.
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Berserk states are, Shay suggests, uncommon but not unheard of in 
complex military environments. They tend to result in a soldier losing all 
sense of vulnerability and propriety and entering into a state of ‘reckless 
frenzy’. They are also, in a sense, natural responses — ‘when a soldier is 
trapped, surrounded, or overrun and facing certain death, the berserk state 
has apparent survival value’ and, because of this, it is difficult to predict who 
will be susceptible to the berserk state, or when it might occur. 
In this case, any form of biomedical intervention that might suppress the 
berserk response, or other forms of counter-moral emotion, would have 
obvious ethical advantages for the army. On the reduction of aggression 
as a moral enhancement (or, at least, a human enhancement with morally 
desirable outcomes), Douglas notes that, 
If I am present when one person attacks another on the street, 
impulsive aggression may be exactly what is required of me. But, on 
many other occasions, impulsive aggression seems like a very bad 
motive to have … [Therefore] a reduction in violent aggression would 
qualify as a moral enhancement.11
It then seems reasonable that if a biomedical intervention were able to 
restrict impulsive aggression in cases of elevated adrenaline or when 
experiencing trauma, such an enhancement might have ethical benefits for 
the treatment of non-combatants by reducing the prevalence of ‘berserk 
states’ and might be ethically defensible. 
2.2 Decision-making and the emotions
However, despite the possible advantages provided by human moral 
enhancements to decision-making and emotion regulation, there are 
several reasons to be cautious before embarking on research, development 
and implementation in this area. First, the presumption that underlies this 
enhancement approach is that the emotions are, at least occasionally, 
pathological in nature and therefore a distraction to rational decision-making. 
However, this school of thought, which finds its strongest intellectual ally in 
the work of Immanuel Kant, is only one philosophical account of rationality.12 
Other accounts see the emotions as inseparable from the way that human 
beings evaluate events and the world around them, such that to dull or 
repress emotion would not enhance decision-making, but detract from it. 
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For example, Sherman argues that ‘emotions … are complexes that include 
evaluations and affects, and that in some cases, though not all, lead to 
desires to act’.13 If so, simply to repress the emotions may restrict unethical 
behaviour, but it may also restrict ethical behaviour motivated by the 
appropriate emotions. In Douglas’s earlier example, an ‘enhanced’ person 
whose impulse for aggression was suppressed would be less likely to move 
in defence of a victim of unjust attack. As such, the army will need to work 
closely with philosophers, psychologists, and behaviouralists to determine 
precisely what role the emotions have in ethical and unethical behaviour in 
order to understand when, or if, it is appropriate ever to suppress them. 
2.3 Military enhancement, autonomy and consent
A third question that the army would need to clearly address and then 
communicate to existing personnel and new recruits alike is whether 
undertaking enhancements that affect emotional responses will be 
mandatory or voluntary. There are merits to each position. The primary 
concern with mandatory enhancement in the broader ethical literature 
surrounds individual freedom. As Michael Selgelid explains, ‘compulsory 
bioenhancements remove the freedom to choose whether or not to be 
morally enhanced’.14 This is particularly troubling in a medical context in 
the West where respect for patient autonomy is among the most crucial 
principles of biomedical ethics. 
However, Selgelid continues, there are also concerns over voluntary moral 
enhancement:
A reason to worry about reliance on voluntary moral bioenhancement, 
in any case, is that those most likely to commit heinous acts with 
catastrophic consequences are probably not especially likely to 
volunteer for moral enhancement.15
Furthermore, he adds: 
Freedom is not the only thing that matters morally. We sometimes 
rightly infringe on people’s freedoms in order to promote achievement 
of other societal goals such as utility (ie, aggregate well-being).16
This latter argument is particularly interesting in a military context, where 
soldiers forego particular rights — including particular medical rights — to 
improve the ability of armed forces to defend the nation. Soldiers commit, 
13
Australian Army Journal 
Autumn, Volume XIII, No 1
Soldier Enhancement:  
Ethical Risks and Opportunities
Patrick Mileham argues, to a relationship of ‘unlimited liability’ when they 
enlist,17 and in doing so waive particular rights including, as Michael Gross 
states, ‘their autonomy, privacy, right to informed consent, and right to 
refuse particular treatments’.18 As such, there is precedent for the army to 
make human enhancement a compulsory medical intervention if it is deemed 
necessary, a determination which the army ought to invest considerable time 
and resources in making.
Military enhancements: ethical risks
1. Challenges to core army values
The Australian Army lists four values — courage, initiative, respect and 
teamwork — as ‘the bedrock to everything [it does]’.19 These institutional 
values form part of what Shannon E. French calls ‘the warrior code of 
honour’.20 Embodying these values, and the virtues by which they are 
expressed, represents what it means to be an Australian soldier. For many 
soldiers, their profession occupies a large element of their self-identity. 
However, as French explains, warrior identity is defined in part by the 
narrative tradition of the warrior community. As such, there is a real risk that 
enhanced personnel will challenge the army’s core values to such an extent 
that they will contest what it means to be an Australian soldier. In so doing, 
they may challenge, undermine or redefine core army values.
Courage is one of the most frequent virtues mentioned in connection with 
military life. Christian Enemark is not alone in arguing that ‘physical courage 
is the most important military virtue’.21 However, as Enemark notes, military 
conceptions of courage are frequently predicated on the notion of war as 
a contest. Warfighters whose risk of injury or death is severely restricted 
or eradicated (Enemark focuses on unmanned aerial vehicle pilots) are not 
courageous warriors but ‘post-heroic’ soldiers. The very ability of these 
soldiers to be heroes vis-à-vis courage is eliminated.22 Enemark’s discussion 
of physical courage is significant because the army’s own account of 
courage as a value includes reference to both physical and moral courage.  
Of course, the discussions diverge insofar as enhanced soldiers do still 
encounter risk in their operations; they are not entirely removed from danger 
in the same way as drone pilots. However, as enhanced personnel are 
likely to feel less vulnerable and enjoy real physical advantages over many 
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opponents, their presence still undermines an account of war as a contest. 
As such, an intrinsic aspect of warrior identity and honour is diminished. 
Enhanced warfighters may risk feeling shamed for taking what might be 
seen as an ‘unfair advantage’ in combat; on the other hand, the importance 
of physical courage as a core value for the army may also be diminished as 
more enhanced soldiers engage in less evenly contested combat situations.
There are two ways in which the army can minimise the risks posed to 
courage as a core value. First, it can emphasise that a major motivation 
in seeking human enhancement is not to gain a tactical advantage over 
unenhanced enemies, but to provide Australian soldiers a level playing field 
in a contest against enhanced opponents. In this way, criticisms based 
on the war-as-contest view will have no basis. Furthermore, courage-
based criticisms could be rebuffed if the army were to move away from a 
conception of courage as derived from war as a contest. If the army were 
to consider all forms of courage as moral courage, it could begin to account 
for courage as the ability to do what is right, despite the difficulties involved, 
without risking the conflation of courage with the experience of physical 
risk.23 
The values of respect and teamwork also risk being challenged or 
undermined by the inclusion of enhanced soldiers. As French’s work 
suggests, warrior communities rely heavily on honour, both moral and 
practical, which is afforded based on how well a person fulfils the demands 
of being a warrior. Ideally, enhanced soldiers would better fulfil those 
requirements than their unenhanced peers. This risks developing a culture of 
resentment, disdain and disconnection between enhanced and unenhanced 
soldiers that is detrimental to respect and teamwork within the army. One 
way of overcoming this may be to avoid making divisions on the basis of 
enhancement status and instead utilise blended divisions to encourage 
social cohesion and cooperation. 
2.	 Legal	difficulties
The use of enhanced warfighters prompts new legal difficulties that warrant 
close attention by the army and collaboration with military and international 
lawyers to ensure army policy does not undermine or violate the law of 
armed conflict (LOAC). Perhaps the chief challenge to LOAC concerns the 
legal status of enhanced warfighters. There is some debate as to whether 
the enhanced warfighter might be classified as a weapon under international 
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law, and therefore be subject not only to LOAC as a human agent, but also 
to weapons review subject to Article 36 of the Geneva Conventions.24 This 
question is important for purposes of legal governance, but also gives rise 
to another pressing concern, namely the question of how to assign moral 
responsibility in cases of enhanced warfighters. 
If a weapon is deployed in violation of international law, intuition suggests 
that the person wielding it will be held responsible. The weapon is not a 
moral agent, which is why it is assigned a separate moral and legal status 
from the combatant. However, this analogy may not extend to enhanced 
warfighters, who are simultaneously weapon and wielder. Legal difficulties 
may arise in future if soldiers who violate LOAC blame their enhancements 
for these violations. If warfighters are also classified as weapons, there are 
real difficulties in assigning moral or legal culpability to their actions. 
Perhaps the most obvious way of addressing this difficulty is to avoid use 
of enhancements that might lead to a warfighter being assigned ‘weapon’ 
status. How (or if) this is possible will require further research, but one 
possibility would be to ensure physical enhancements are accompanied 
by neurological and, where possible, moral enhancements. However, it 
will also be critical to ensure that all warfighters and commanding officers 
are fully aware of their moral and legal status under international law prior 
to the deployment of any enhanced personnel, and that any issues of 
moral responsibility are resolved, disclosed and accepted by involved 
parties (medical scientists, officers, soldiers, engineers, etc.) prior to the 
implementation of any such technologies.
3. Treatment of enhanced veterans
The final area of ethical concern regarding enhanced personnel is how 
to deal with discharge when their service is complete. This involves two 
major concerns. The first is how enhanced personnel will be able to adapt 
to day-to-day civilian life outside the military. As many authors have noted, 
veterans already face difficulties re-engaging with civilian society and risk 
being ‘exiled’ in various ways.25 If these personnel are also equipped with 
enhanced physical or cognitive abilities, the dissonance between war and 
peacetime (itself a source of psychological distress) is likely to deepen.26 
A second difficulty arises if enhanced personnel seek further employment 
in other force-deploying professions such as police officers, security staff 
or private mercenaries. This employment path is not uncommon, but it 
16
Australian Army Journal 
Autumn, Volume XIII, No 1
Soldier Enhancement: 
Ethical Risks and Opportunities
provokes serious ethical and governance issues as many of the ethical 
justifications for enhancement in a military context will not be applicable 
in these other professions. However, to prohibit enhanced veterans from 
seeking employment in these fields may provoke psychological episodes, 
violate anti-discrimination employment law and, in extreme cases, lead to 
criminal activity by enhanced veterans. 
It is not immediately clear how to overcome these difficulties apart from 
providing extensive psychological and family support for enhanced 
personnel and perhaps providing them ongoing gainful employment within 
the military where possible. In this the army will need to work closely with 
the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to monitor the well-being and activity of 
enhanced warfighters. 
A final issue concerning the treatment of enhanced veterans relates to the 
ownership and control of the military technology that now resides within 
the body of these veterans. Military interest requires that this technology 
be closely controlled and guarded to avoid its use or re-purpose for 
unethical reasons. However to do this in cases where human beings are 
the technology may risk violating their autonomy and failing to respect 
them as fully rights-bearing citizens in the post-war context. It may be that 
the army requires all warfighters to consent to prolonged control over their 
activities and bodies prior to receiving enhancements. But, as Nicholas 
Evans and Jonathan Moreno note, ‘enhancement might well turn out to be 
forever. Whether a warfighter is able to consent to this type of relationship 
— whether they should be able to do so — should be a serious question in 
future works on the subject.’27
Conclusion
Military enhancement provides a range of opportunities for the army to 
pursue not only military, but ethical goals. These enhancements may also 
provide increased adherence to the ethical principles that govern armed 
conflict. However, this also gives rise to a range of ethical challenges, 
several of which do not attract easy answers. This study highlights some 
ethical baselines that decision-makers should treat as inviolable. It also 
reveals some factors that decision-makers would be wise to consider 
before reaching a conclusion on the extent to which enhancement is a 
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viable option. This article recommends that armies not pursue human 
enhancement before considering the following:
1. Development of institutional measures to ensure respect for the 
autonomy of soldiers in the experimental and implementation stages. 
Doctors and medical scientists must provide sufficient information 
concerning health risks, and officers and lawyers must ensure that 
soldiers understand the moral and legal implications of enhancement. 
Only once soldiers demonstrate an understanding of these risks can they 
be considered acceptable candidates for enhancement. 
2. Recommitment to the morality and laws of war, in particular, to conditions 
restricting the use of force to situations where it is necessary, justified and 
proportionate. 
3. Liaison with lawyers, philosophers and other experts to resolve issues 
of ownership concerning enhancement, in particular, how these apply to 
veterans whose services have concluded. 
4. Engagement with lawyers and philosophers to resolve questions of moral 
and legal responsibility for enhanced soldiers, engineers, scientists, 
officers and other stakeholders. The army must ensure these groups are 
aware of, and consent to, their responsibilities. 
5. Obtaining guidance from psychologists, behaviouralists and philosophers 
to ensure that suppressing or enhancing particular emotions will not 
undermine important moral or psychological processes. 
6. Engagement with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to provide re-
integration and post-war support for both enhanced and unenhanced 
veterans.
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